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FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE

hearsay definition found in Federal Rule 801 closely corresponds to that used by Louisiana courts, Federal Rule 801
and the developing jurisprudence construing it may provide a
practical model for the codification of Louisiana evidence law.
Susan R. Kelly

HEARSAY EVIDENCE AND THE FEDERAL RULES:
ARTICLE VIIIII. EXCEPTIONS TO THE HEARSAY RULE:
EXPANDING THE LIMITS OF ADMISSIBILITY
In addition to the exemptions from the hearsay definition
provided in Rule 801(d), 120 the Federal Rules of Evidence,
following the traditional scheme,'1 2 also allow numerous extrajudicial assertions to escape the general ban against hearsay evidence 122 under certain exceptions, when deemed
necessary to the interests of justice and the circumstances
generally assure reliability.'2 Two rules comprise these exceptions: Rule 803 includes those exceptions that apply
whether or not the declarant is available, and Rule 804 contains those which apply only when the declarant is unavailable. Both rules conclude with identical residual exceptions
authorizing admission of hearsay evidence not covered by one
of the explicit exceptions, provided the evidence has "equivalent guarantees of trustworthiness" and meets other gen124
eralized conditions.
Rules 803 and 804 revise and expand the traditional hearsay exceptions, yet, in accordance with the general policy of
the redactors,125 rarely incorporate applicable constitutional
120. For text of Rule 801(d), see notes 70-71, supra.
121. See generally C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE §§ 254-323 (Cleary ed. 1972);
5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1420-1684 (Chadborn rev. 1974).
122. FED. R. EvID. 802: "Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by
these rules or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to
statutory authority or by Act of Congress."
123. FED. R. EvID. 803, 804. Space limitations prevent analysis of each of
the 29 exceptions set forth under these two rules; thus only the highlights of
those that most significantly affect existing law, especially in Louisiana, are
discussed in this comment.
124. FED. R. EVID. 803(24), 804(5). For text of these rules, see note 131,
infra.
125. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. art. VIII, Adv. Comm. Note; Discussionof the
Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence Before the Annual Judicial Conference,
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principles. Additionally, the Rules seldom specify different

provisions for civil and criminal cases, and they never establish different requirements for bench and jury trials.
The Advisory Committee's Notes clearly indicate that
even though evidence satisfies one of the enumerated hearsay exceptions, it is not automatically admissible. 126 For
example, evidence must be excluded when its admission
would conflict with an overriding constitutional principle
such as the defendant's right to confront and cross-examine
the witnesses against him. 127 Additionally, under Rule 403,128
evidence may be found inadmissible if its probative value is
outweighed by the risk of prejudice. 129 Although evidence
may fit into a particular hearsay exception, its reliability in
any specific instance may be adversely affected by such factors as self-serving motives, ambiguity, inaccurate perception, or inadequate memory. 130 Thus, before deciding whether
a hearsay statement otherwise admissible under an exception
can be introduced into evidence, the court should evaluate
these considerations in light of the specific circumstances of
each case.
2d Cir., 48 F.R.D. 39, 42 (1969); Cleary, Plan for the Adoption of Rules of
Evidence for United States District Courts, 25 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 142, 146
(1970).
126. "The exceptions are phrased in terms of nonapplication of the hearsay rule, rather than in positive terms of admissibility, in order to repel any
implication that other possible grounds for exclusion are eliminated from
consideration." FED. R. EVID. 803, Adv. Comm. Note. See also FED. R. EVID.
art. VIII, Adv. Comm. Note. See the introductory language in Rules 803 and
804.
127. The parameters of the hearsay rule and the right of confrontation
are not coextensive. See, e.g., Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970); California
v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155-56 (1970); Baker, The Right to Confrontation, The
Hearsay Rules, and Due Process-A Proposal for Determining When Hearsay
May be Used in Criminal Trials, 6 CONN. L. REV. 529, 541 (1974); Note,
Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule, 75 YALE LJ. 1434, 1437 (1966). Thus
evidence deemed admissible under one of the exceptions may nevertheless
violate the constitutional right of an accused to confront the witnesses
against him. E.g., Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968); Pointer v. Texas, 380
U.S. 400 (1965). See generally Comment, Hearsay, the ConfrontationGuarantee and Related Problems, 30 LA. L. REV. 651 (1970); Comment, Preserving the
Right to Confrontation-A New Approach to Hearsay Evidence in Criminal
Trials, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 741 (1965).
128. For text of Rule 403, see note 28, supra.
129. Unreliable evidence is prejudicial and tends to overbalance whatever probative value might be derived from its use.
130. See text beginning at note 41, supra.
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The Residual Exceptions
Perhaps the most controversial of the enumerated hearsay exceptions are the two identically-worded omnibus provisions, Rules 803(24) and 804(5),131 which sanction the introduction of hearsay assertions not admissible under an explicit
exception when they are made under circumstances affording
"equivalent guarantees of trustworthiness." Additionally,
these residual exceptions require that a proffered assertion
tend to establish a material fact, 132 that it be more probative
on the question at issue than other reasonably obtainable
evidence, and that its admission serve the "purposes of the
rules" and the "interests of justice." 133 Finally, an opponent
must be given advance notice of the proponent's intention to
134
introduce the assertion.

The redactors recognized that situations are certain to
arise in which reliable hearsay evidence that fails to satisfy
the requirements of an express exception is important to the
131. FED. R. EvID. 803(24), 804(5): "A statement not specifically covered
by any of the foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial
guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more
probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which
the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general
purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by
admission of the statement into evidence. However, a statement may not be
admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it makes known to the
adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the
adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, his intention to
offer the statement and the particulars of it, including the name and address
of the declarant."
132. The Federal Rules pertaining to relevancy do not utilize the term
"material facts," but instead refer to facts which are of consequence to the
determination of the action. Presumably the notions involved are identical.
See FED. R. EVID. 401; Comment, Determining Relevancy: Article IV of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, 36 LA. L. REV. 70, 73 (1975).

133. FED. R. EVID. 803(24), 804(5).
134. The Supreme Court draft of the residual exceptions merely provided
for the admissibility of "[a] statement not specifically covered by any of the
foregoing exceptions but having comparable circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness." Fed. R. Evid. 803(24), 804(b)(6) (Sup. Ct. Draft 1972). Both
exceptions were deleted by the House Judiciary Committee. See H.R. REP.
No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1973). The Senate Judiciary Committee
reinstated them, see S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 18-20 (1974), and
added all of the present qualifications except the notice requirement, which
the Conference Committee inserted. See H.R. REP. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 11-12 (1974).
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determination of truth. 135 Thus they included the omnibus
exceptions to provide a necessary measure of judicially administered flexibility. 36 Although the possibility exists that a
rule authorizing such a discretionary power may be utilized
frequently and perhaps imprudently, legislative history reveals that the intent of Congress was that the residual exceptions be used "very rarely and only in exceptional circumstances."' 137 The Senate Judiciary Committee expressly
exhorted that the omnibus exceptions not be construed as a
"broad license" to admit evidence not otherwise fitting one of
the explicit exceptions, nor be used to judicially revise the
3
hearsay rule via the formulation of new rigid exceptions.l s
Rather, the provisions were meant to be used only when the
circumstances of an individual case indicate that the hearsay
evidence is sufficiently reliable and necessary to justify its
admissibility.1 39 Inasmuch as the residual exceptions are
formulated so inexplicitly, courts will have to be especially
circumspect when applying them in criminal cases to avoid
possible infringement of the defendant's right of confrontation.

40

Exceptions in Which Unavailability of Declarant
Is Not Required
Rule 803 comprises those exceptions to the hearsay rule
that are applicable regardless of the availability of the declarant. These exceptions include any assertive statement
135. See FED. R. EVID. 803(24), Adv. Comm. Note; S. REP. No. 1277, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 18-20 (1974). See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 411 F.2d 1134
(10th Cir. 1969); Dallas County v. Commercial Union Assur. Co., 286 F.2d 388
(5th Cir. 1961); United States v. Barbati, 284 F. Supp. 409 (E.D.N.Y. 1968);
Salley Grocery Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 223 So. 2d 5 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1969).
136. In the first preliminary draft of Rules 803 and 804, the Advisory
Committee took a much broader discretionary approach than that ultimately
adopted, by permitting the judge to evaluate any hearsay evidence in light of
its trustworthiness and necessity and listing the enumerated rules as illustrations rather than as specific exceptions. Fed. R. Evid. 8-03, 8-04 (Prelim.
Draft 1969).
137. S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1974). See also, H.R. REP.
No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1973) (explaining House deletion of the
proposed residual provision); 120 CONG. REC. H-12255-59 (daily ed. Dec. 18,
1974) (House debate over whether to adopt Conference Committee's Report).
138. S.REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1974).
139. Id. at 18-20.
140. See discussion in note 127, supra.
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made or recorded under circumstances offering some assurance of reliability deemed unlikely to be especially enhanced
by the declarant's presence as a witness at trial. 14 ' When the
declarant is in fact unavailable, however, use of his extrajudicial statement against a criminal defendant necessarily in-

volves confrontation problem S.142
Declarations of Then Existing Mental, Emotional, or
Physical Condition; Present Sense Impressions; and
Excited Utterances
The first three provisions of Rule 803 embrace several
previously-acknowledged exceptions authorizing the admission of various assertive spontaneous declarations, all of
which at times have been considered admissible as part of the
res gestae.' 43 However, authorities generally agree that the
term res gestae has been rendered virtually meaningless by
its indiscriminate use as a justification for the admission of
out-of-court utterances irrespective of whether offered as
nonhearsay, to prove the fact that they were made, or as
hearsay, to prove the truth of the assertion.144 Consequently,
in keeping with the trend toward a more precise definition of
the hearsay rule, 145 the Federal Rules abandon the term res
gestae.
Instead, the Rules obviate the confusion surrounding the
failure to distinguish between hearsay and nonhearsay use of
spontaneous declarations by postulating a bifurcated
rationale for their admissibility. As noted above,1 46 the effect
of Rule 801(c) is to exclude from the definition of hearsay
those statements offered nonassertively. Hence, extrajudicial
utterances or acts offered only to prove the fact that they
were made rather than the truth of the assertion, such as
141. See FED. R. EvID. 803, 804(b), Adv. Comm. Notes.
142. See discussion in note 127, supra. If the declarant is available, constitutional problems are mitigated by the fact that under Rule 806, the
defendant may call the declarant as his own witness and cross-examine him
on the statement. Additionally, Rule 607 allows a party to impeach the
credibility of his own witness.
143. See MCCORMICK § 288.
144: See, e.g., 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1767 (3d ed. 1940); MCCORMICK
§ 288; J. THAYER, LEGAL ESSAYS 207, 245 (1908); Comment, Res Gestae: A
Synonym for Confusion, 20 BAYLOR L. REV. 229 (1968); Comment, Excited
Utterances and Present Sense Impressions as Exceptions to the Hearsay
Rule in Louisiana, 29 LA. L. REV. 661, 663 (1969).
145. See MCCORMICK § 288.
146. See text beginning at note 17, supra.
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those comprising operative facts or parts of the act done, are
nonhearsay. Conversely, if a statement is offered testimonially, to prove the truth of the matter asserted, it is hearsay
but may be nonetheless admissible if it fits under one of the
recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule. Like many other
courts throughout the country,'147 Louisiana courts have at
times failed to differentiate use of spontaneous statements
for their assertive and nonassertive value. 14 However, recent
cases indicate that Louisiana courts are beginning to confine
the use of res gestae to its narrower definition 1 49 encompassing spontaneous statements by the participants offered to
establish the factual context of an event' 50 and to recognize
specific exceptions to the hearsay rule when a statement is
5
offered to prove the truth of an assertion.1 '
Several kinds of spontaneous declarations that have been
deemed admissible as exceptions to the hearsay rule 152 are
aggregated under Rule 803(3). 153 Included in this exception
are declarations of then existing sensations, emotions, physical conditions, and states of mind.
As indicated above,'154 the Federal Rules treat as
147. See MCCORMICK §§ 288-89.
148. See, e.g., State v. Reese, 250 La. 151, 194 So. 2d 729 (1967). For
examples of nonhearsay evidence admitted under the res gestae exception,
see, e.g., State v. DiVincenti, 232 La. 13, 93 So. 2d 676 (1957); State v. Rice, 159
La. 820, 106 So. 2d 317 (1925). See also Comment, Excited Utterances and
Present Sense Impressions as Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule in Louisiana,
29 LA. L. REV. 661 (1969).
149. The res gestae exception is covered by statute in Louisiana. LA. R.S.
15:447 (1950): "Res gestae are events speaking for themselves under the
immediate pressure of the occurence, through the instructive, impulsive and
spontaneous words of the participants when narrating the events. What
forms any part of the res gestae is always admissible in evidence." LA. R.S.
15:448 (1950): "To constitute res gestae the circumstances and declarations
must be necessary incidents of the criminal act, or immediate concomitants
of it, or form in conjunction with it one continuous transaction."
150. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 285 So. 2d 240 (La. 1973); State v. Green, 282
So. 2d 461 (La. 1973).
151. See, e.g., State v. Carvin, 308 So. 2d 757 (La. 1975); State v. Smith,
285 So. 2d 240 (La. 1973).
152. See MCCORMICK §§ 291, 294-95.
153. FED. R. EVID. 803(3): ,"A statement of the declarant's then existing
state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition (such as intent, plan,
motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily health), but not including a
statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed
unless it relates to the execution, revocation, identification, or terms of declarant's will." '
154. See text beginning at note 17, supra.
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nonhearsay those statements by a declarant that only inferentially indicate his state of mind and are offered not as proof
of the matter asserted but as circumstantial evidence tending
to prove that he actually possessed that state of mind. 155
However, if the statement is a direct assertion of the declarant's mental state and is offered to prove the truth of the
matter asserted-that he actually possessed that state of
mind,'1 56 or that he probably performed the conduct indicated
by his statement of intent' 57-it is hearsay but may be admissible as an exception under Rule 803(3). 15 s Of course, regardless of whether a declaration of one's mental state is
nonhearsay or fits within an exception to the hearsay rule, if
the risk of prejudice is found to outweigh the probative
value of the evidence, it should be excluded under Rule 403.159
155. A statement such as "I have been happier in New York than any
place else," if offered to show the declarant's intent to remain in New York, is
an example of the nonassertive use of a statement indicating the declarant's
state of mind.
156. If the statement "I plan to live in New York forever" were offered to
prove the speaker's intent to remain in New York, it would be hearsay under
the Federal Rules.
157. See Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285 (1892) (declarant's
statement "I expect to go to Crooked Creek" was admissible to show that he
probably went). The House Judiciary Committee Report states that declarations of intent would be admissible only to prove the future conduct of the
declarant and not that of a third person, thus indicating the preferred solution to a question that the Rules leaves unanswered. H. R. REP. No. 650, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. 13-14 (1973). See People v. Alcade, 24 Cal. 2d 177, 148 P.2d 627
(1944).
158. This rationale accords with the approach taken by Wigmore, 6 WIGMORE § 1715, and UNIFORM RULE OF EVID. 63(12)(a) (1953). Others propose
that when a declaration relating to the speaker's intent is used as an inference that the declarant performed the conduct intended, it should be classified as nonhearsay regardless of whether the declaration was a direct
assertion of the speaker's intent or one from which his intent must be inferred. See, e.g., Comment, Hearsay and Non-Hearsay as Reflected in
Louisiana Criminal Cases, 14 LA. L. REV. 611 (1954).
159. For text of Rule 403, see note 28, supra. For example, Rule 803(3)
ostensibly would not preclude admissibility of statements by a homicide
victim that indicate the victims's fear of what the defendant might do to him.
Any genuine relevance of such statements as proof of the subsequent conduct of the victim usually is outweighed by the risk of prejudice from the
probability that a jury will use them as evidence that the defendant probably
performed the criminal conduct in question. See, e.g., United States v. Brown,
490 F.2d 758 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (overturning murder conviction where statement
by victim to his wife that he believed the defendant was going to kill him was
admitted to show the victim's movements during the time in question and
that he had probably been forced to leave his house). But see State v.
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Although Louisiana courts have often blurred the distinction
between assertive and nonassertive use of declarations of
state of mind,16 0 they have achieved essentially the same
results as the Federal Rules by using the test of independent
relevancy.""
Most of the few Louisiana cases that treat admissibility
of a declarant's spontaneous statements regarding his existing pain are workmen's compensation cases, in which the
technical rules of evidence are not applicable. 6 2 In these
cases, Louisiana courts generally have said such declarations
163
are admissible as part of the res gestae.
Statements of memory or belief offered as proof of past
perceived facts are expressly inadmissible under Rule
803(3)164 except when they pertain to various aspects of the
declarant's will. The distinction in the case of wills accords
with contemporary case law elsewhere in the country16 5 and
66
is admittedly grounded in pragmatism rather than in logic.

There appear to be no Louisiana cases which specifically
treat the issue of admissibility of a testator's retrospective
1 67
statements concerning his will.

Raymond, 258 La. 1, 15, 245 So. 2d 335, 340 (1971) (murder victim's statement
to a third party that the defendant would want to have sexual relations with
him that night held admissible as circumstantial evidence indicating the
victim's fear or "emotional reaction to the presence of the defendant"). For a
critical analysis of the decision, see The Work of the Louisiana Appellate
Courts for the 1970-1971 Term-Evidence, 32 LA. L. REV. 344, 353 (1972).
160. For a discussion of the treatment of declarations pertaining to state
of mind by Louisiana courts, see Comment, Hearsay and Non-Hearsay as
Reflected in Louisiana Criminal Cases, 14 LA. L. REV. 611 (1954).
161. The test of independent relevancy used by Louisiana courts can be
summarized as follows: "[If the content of the statement be such that the
truth of the matter stated is more likely to take effect upon the trier's mind
than is the fact that is was made, with a resulting high risk of undue
prejudice, then the statement is inadmissible." Comment, Hearsay and
Non-Hearsay as Reflected in Louisiana Criminal Cases, 14 LA. L. REV. 611,
624 (1954).
162. LA. R.S. 23:1317 (1950).
163. See, e.g., Allen v. Milk Haulers, Inc., 278 So. 2d 871 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1973); Nini v. Sanford Bros., Inc., 258 So. 2d 647 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972);
Clifton v. Arnold, 87 So. 2d 386 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1956); Zito v. Standard Acc.
Ins. Co., 76 So. 2d 25 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1944); Arrington v. Singer Sewing
Mach. Co., 16 So. 2d 145 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1943).
164. See Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96 (1933).
165. See cases collected in MCCORMICK § 296; Annot., 62 A.L.R.2d 855
(1958); Annot., 28 A.L.R.3d 944 (1969).
166. FED. R. EVID. 803(3), Adv. Comm. Note. See also MCCORMICK § 296.
167. It is not clear whether Louisiana courts would allow verbal retro-

1975]

FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE

Rule 803(1), 16s based on the relatively recently recognized
exception sanctioning admission of descriptive or explanatory
statements made while a declarant was perceiving an
event, 169 expands its scope to include statements made immediately after the observation. Since the principal guarantee of reliability is deemed furnished by the contemporaneity
of the event and the statement,' 70 it is essential that this
extension be literally interpreted with emphasis on immediacy if the intendment of the Rule is to be achieved. Rule
803(2)171 conforms to the conventional exception for statements uttered under the influence of and relating to a startling event.' 72 Under this exception, the character of the
event itself determines whether the statement was made
173
within a permissible lapse of time to insure its reliability.
Louisiana courts have generally admitted both present sense
impressions and excited utterances under the label of res
gestae.'7 4 Recently, however, the Louisiana Supreme Court,
in line with the scheme adopted by the Federal Rules, has
tended to treat such statements as specific separate excep17 5
tions to the hearsay rule.
spective statements by a testator to be used as evidence. In some cases, the
courts have admitted extrinsic evidence of a testator's prospective intentions. See, e.g., Ivey v. Bailey, 175 La. 211, 143 So. 52 (1932); Succession of
Cardone, 271 So. 2d 338 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1972). In other cases, the courts have
stated that parol proof of a testator's verbal declaration of intent is inadmissible. See, e.g., Succession of Rusha, 158 La. 74, 103 So. 515 (1925); Succession
of Faggard, 152 So. 2d 627 (La. App. 2d Cir 1963); See also LA. CIV. CODE art.
1712.
168. FED. R. EVID. 803(1): "A statement describing or explaining an
event or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or
condition, or immediately thereafter."
169. See, e.g., Houston Oxygen Co. v. Davis, 139 Tex. 1, 161 S.W.2d 474
(1942); MCCORMICK § 298.
170. See MCCORMICK § 298.
171. FED. R. EVID. 803(2): "A statement relating to a startling event or
condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement
caused by the event or condition."
172. See MCCORMICK § 297.
173. Permissible content of the statement differs under Rules 803(1) and
803(2). Declarations admitted as excited utterances need only relate to the
startling event, whereas those introduced as present sense impressions are
restricted to descriptions or explanations of the event being perceived.
174. For a discussion of Louisiana cases dealing with present sense impressions and excited utterances, see Comment, Excited Utterances and Present Sense Impressions as Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule in Louisiana,29 LA.

L. REV. 661 (1969).
175. See, e.g., State v. Carvin, 308 So. 2d 757 (La. 1975); State v. Smith,
285 So. 2d 240 (La. 1973).
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Statements for Purposes of Medical Diagnosis or Treatment
Statements of then existing bodily condition made to a
physician for the purpose of treatment are recognized as an
exception to the hearsay rule in many jurisdictions. 176 Federal Rule 803(4), 177 following the minority view, 1 78 expressly
enlarges the exception to include statements of medical history, of past symptoms, pain, or sensations, and of external
source or cause if "reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or
treatment."'1 The scattered Louisiana cases dealing with the
admissibility of statements made to a treating physician by a
patient do not clearly establish any general rules. i 0 In one
recent Louisiana court of appeal case, however, a patient's
statement describing her then existing bodily condition was
held to be admissible "within the recognized exception of
spontaneous declaration[s]." ' 1
The language of the Federal Rule does not expressly limit
its application to statements made to a physician or by a
patient. Thus, statements made to or by hospital attendants,
ambulance drivers, nurses, members of the family, or even
bystanders conceivably might be admissible. 8 2 The assurance
176. See MCCORMICK § 292.
177. FED. R. EVID. 803(4): "Statements made for purposes of medical
diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present
symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the
cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis
or treatment."
178. See MCCORMICK § 292.
179. Statements concerning fault would not qualify. See FED. R. EVID.
803(4), Adv. Comm. Note.
180. See, e.g., Marler v. Texas Pac. Ry., 52 La. Ann. 727, 27 So. 176 (1900)
(statement reciting cause of accident was inadmissible); Becnel v. Ward, 286
So. 2d 731, 733 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 290 So. 2d 900 (La. 1974)
(statement describing then existing bodily condition admissible "within the
recognized exception of spontaneous declaration[s]"); Auzene v. Gulf Public
Service Co., 188 So. 512 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1939) (statement shortly after the
event concerning cause of the accident admissible as part of the res gestae).
In workmen's compensation cases, where more relaxed rules of evidence are
applicable, LA. R.S. 23:1317 (1950), Louisiana courts generally admit as res
gestae patients' statements of then existing bodily conditions, see, e.g., Clifton
v. Arnold, 87 So. 2d 386 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1956); Arrington v. Singer Sewing
Mach. Co., 16 So. 2d 145 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1943), as well as statements reciting
the cause of the injury, see, e.g., Nini v. Sanford Bros., Inc., 258 So. 2d 647 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1972); Youngblood v. Colfax Motor Co., 125 So, 883 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1930).
181. Becnel v. Ward, 286 So. 2d 731, 733 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 290 So. 2d 900 (La. 1974).
182. The Advisory Committee's Note discusses the admissibility of
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of reliability underlying this exception rests upon the belief
that patients seeking treatment are primarily interested in
giving a physician accurate information to facilitate effective
treatment. 18 3 The same rationale generally applies when the
declarant describes past pain, relates his case history, or
identifies the external cause of his condition, 18 and probably
also when the statement is made to someone other than a
doctor if relevant to treatment. Guarantees of reliability may
not be present, however, when the statement is made by
someone other than a patient. 185 Moreover, use of a third
party's extrajudicial statements as substantive evidence
against a criminal defendant involves special problems regarding the right of confrontation. 18 6
The Advisory Committee's Note makes it clear that Rule
803(4) encompasses statements made to a physician consulted
solely for the purpose of enabling him to testify as an expert
witness. 87 In Louisiana'8 8 as well as most American jurisdictions, 89 statements made under these circumstances are
generally admissible only as a foundation for the physician's
expert testimony, and not as substantive evidence. Although
the redactors were probably correct when they observed that
juries are unlikely to appreciate the distinction, 190 it seems
significant nonetheless. The reliability of statements made to
physicians with a view toward litigation may be highly suspect because a plaintiff's motive and purpose might well have
been to acquire favorable testimony rather than effective
treatment.
Public Records and Reports
Although certain official written statements are recognized as falling under an exception to the hearsay rule, their
statements made to others than a physician but does not mention statements
made by others than a patient. FED. R. EVID. 803(4), Adv. Comm. Note.
183. Perhaps the Federal Rule should have required that the declarant
believe his statement was made for purposes of diagnosis or treatment, similarly to the Rule 804(b)(2) exception for dying declarations, under which the
declarant must actually believe that his death is imminent when he makes
the statement. See quotation in note 248, infra.
184. See MCCORMICK § 292.

185. The dirth of judicial or doctrinal support for admissibility of such
statements is probably indicative of their lack of reliability.
186. See discussion in note 127, supra.
187. FED. R. EVID. 803(4), Adv. Comm. Note.
188. See, e.g., State v. Watley, 301 So. 2d 332 (La. 1974).
189. See MCCORMICK § 293.

190. FED. R. EviD. 803(4), Adv. Comm. Note.
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admissibility is most often regulated by specific statutes. 19 1
To the extent that provisions (a) and (b) of Rule 803(8)192 allow
admission of public reports of agency activities and of matters observed pursuant to official duty, except reports by
police and law enforcement officers in criminal cases, 193 the
Rule substantially accords with existing law in many jurisdictions. 9 4 In Louisiana, however, although a number of public records are statutorily admissible despite the hearsay
rule,'1 95 the courts apparently do not recognize a broad exception covering the general category of public records.
Moreover, while the Federal Rule ostensibly authorizes the
admissiblity of police reports in civil cases, Louisiana courts
96
generally hold to the contrary.'
The more controversial aspect of Rule 803(8) is provision
(c), under which "factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant ... to law" are admissible in civil cases
and against the government in criminal cases. The ambiguity
of the phrase "factual findings" and the question of whether
191. See MCCORMICK § 315.
192. FED. R. EVID. 803(8): "Records, reports, statements, or data compilations, in any form, of public offices or agencies, setting forth (A) the activities
of the office or agency, or (B) matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by
law as to which matters there was a duty to report, excluding, however, in
criminal cases matters observed by police officers and other law enforcement
personnel, or (C) in civil actions and proceedings and against the Government
in criminal cases, factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law, unless the sources of information or other
circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness."
193. Rule 803(8)(B) was expressly amended on the House floor to add the
requirement that there be a duty to report matters observed pursuant to
official duty and, more significantly, to exclude such reports in criminal cases
when made by police and other law enforcement officers. The House discussion of the amendment excluding police reports reveals that the legislative
intent was that such reports should not merely be read into evidence and
that the police officer should be required to take the stand and afford the
defendant the opportunity to cross-examine him. See 120 CONG. REC. H56365 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1974). To the extent that these reports are not admissible
on behalf of a criminal defendant, the present restriction seems unjustified.
194. See MCCORMICK §§ 315-20.
195. See, e.g., LA. R.S. 13:3711-12 (1950) (records of state and local agencies); LA. R.S. 13:3714 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1966, No. 161 § 1
(hospital records); LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 105 (coroner's report and proces
verbal of coroner's inquest).
196. E.g., Robinson v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 298 So. 2d 282 (La.
App. 1st Cir.), cert. denied, 302 So. 2d 23 (1974); Veal v. Hutchinson, 284 So. 2d
60 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 286 So. 2d 662 (1973); Deville v. Aetna Ins.
Co., 191 So. 2d 324 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967).
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it should be interpreted to include evaluative reports already
has inspired dispute. 197 Additionally, the provision does not
specify whether the reporting officials's findings may be
based upon information supplied by third persons or only
upon his own observations. 198 Rule 803(8), however, is buttressed by several specific safeguards which, if properly observed, should prevent the admission of unacceptable evidence. 199 In particular, the Rule provides that public records
and reports are not admissible if "the sources of information
or other circumstances indicate a lack of trustworthiness,"
and the Advisory Committee's Note includes 20suggested
0
guidelines for the determination of reliability.
Both the Rule 803(8) exception for public records and the
Rule 803(6)201 exception for business records authorize admission of "data compilations," a term sufficiently broad to include computer printouts. 20 2 Computerized records require
special consideration relative to the reliability of the data
originally stored and the interpretation placed on the data
197. The Advisory Committee's Note suggests that evaluative reports
that are clearly reliable are admissible. FED. R. EVID. 803(8), Adv. Comm.
Note. The House Judiciary Committee Report states that "factual findings"
should be strictly construed and evaluative reports "shall not be admissible
under this Rule." H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1973). The
Senate Judiciary Committee Report takes issue with the House Committee
Report and concludes that they should be admissible. S. REP. No. 1277, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1974). The Conference Committee Report leaves the matter unresolved. See H.R. REP. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1974).
198. As a general rule, even in those jurisdictions which admit reports
containing the official's conclusions or summaries, courts firmly impose the
first-hand knowledge requirement to restrict the use of such reports to prove
only those things observed by the officer himself. See MCCORMICK § 317. For a
discussion of the application of this rule with regard to police reports, see
Annot., 69 A.L.R.2d 1148 (1960).
199. In addition to these specific safeguards, Rule 403, which applies to
all hearsay exceptions, permits the exclusion of otherwise relevant evidence if
the risk of prejudice outweighs its probative value. For text of Rule 403, see
note 28, supra.
200. Committee guidelines for the determination of admissibility include:
(1) the timeliness of the investigation, (2) the special skill or experience of the
official, (3) whether a hearing was held and the level at which conducted, (4)
possible motivation problems suggested by Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109
(1943) (nonroutine report of party aligned in interest with proponent
excluded). FED. R. EVID. 803(8), Adv. Comm. Note.
201. For text of Rule 803(6), see note 208, infra.
202. The Louisiana Supreme Court recently admitted a computer printout under the business record exception. State v. Hodgeson, 305 So. 2d 421
(La. 1974).
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retrieved. For these reasons, when computer printouts are
submitted for use as substantive evidence, courts should
exercise extra caution in determining that the foundation is
sufficient to establish their reliability.
Records of a Regularly Conducted Business Activity
As in the case of public records, 20 3 the admissibility of
business records as an exception to the hearsay rule is governed by legislation in most jurisdictions. 20 4 The modern
statutes have relaxed many of the restrictions found in the
historical hearsay exception for regularly kept records of a
regularly conducted business activity, 20 5 influencing its development in the remaining jurisdictions, 20 r including Louisiana, 20 7 that have not enacted similar legislation.
203. See text at note 191, supra.
204. This is largely due to the extensive adoption of the Commonwealth
Fund Act, now codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1732(a) (1970), and the Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act, 9A U.L.A. § 506 (1965). See also MODEL CODE
OF EVID. rule 514 (1942); UNIFORM RULE OF EVID. 63(13) (1953).
205. The traditional form of this exception may be summarized as "a
permanent record made in the ordinary course of business, by a person
unavailable for testimony, from personal knowledge of the facts recorded or
from information furnished by one having a business duty to observe and
report the facts, is admissible as proof of the facts recorded, in the absence of
a strong motive to misrepresent, if the record is the first collected and
recorded memorial." Comment, Business Records in Louisiana as an Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 21 LA. L. REV. 449, 451 (1961). See generally MCCORMICK § 306. The more recent codifications change the historical requirement
that the recorder and his informant be unavailable, and instead permit the
custodian or other qualified witness to furnish the requisite foundation testimony authenticating the record and explaining the recordation procedure.
These statutes also relax the condition that the record be the first collected
and require only that the record be one that is permanent. See, e.g., model
statutes cited in note 204, supra. FED. R. EVID. 803(6) similarly adopts these
provisions. For text of Rule 803(6), see note 208, infra.
206. See generally MCCORMICK § 306.
207. Louisiana generally follows the traditional version of the exception
with the modifications discussed at note 204, supra. For a discussion of the
application of the business record exception in civil cases in Louisiana, see
Comment, Business Records in Louisiana as an Exception to the Hearsay
Rule, 21 LA. L. REV. 449 (1961). See also LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2248-50; LA. R.S.
13:3714 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1966, No. 161 § 1; LA. R.S. 13:3733
(Supp. 1952). For examples of Louisiana criminal cases in which the exception
has more recently been applied, see State v. Hodgeson, 305 So. 2d 421 (La.
1974) (computer printout); State v. Lewis, 288 So. 2d 348 (La. 1974); State v.
Graves, 259 La. 526, 250 So. 2d 727 (1971).
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The Federal Rule 803(6)208 exception for business records
continues the trend toward liberalization by significantly
broadening certain provisions beyond previous formulations.
For example, although the Federal Rule retains the customary limitation that only records of a regularly conducted
business activity are admissible, 20 9 the definition of "business" is expansive, encompassing institutions, associations,
professions, and "calling[s] of every kind, whether or not conducted for profit. '210 Furthermore, the Rule extends the permissible subjects of record-keeping beyond the previously
more limited range of acts, conditions or events, 21' to include
''opinions or diagnoses."
In contrast with the Rule 803(8) exception for public records under which reports embracing factual findings are not
208. FED. R. EVID. 803(6): "A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at
or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with
knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity,
and if it was the regular practice of that business activity to make the
memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness, unless the source of
information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of
trustworthiness. The term 'business' as used in this paragraph includes
business, institution, association, profession, occupation, and calling of every
kind, whether or not conducted for profit."
209. The Supreme Court draft of Rule 803(6) made admissible records of
any regularly conducted activity without mentioning the term "business."
Fed. R. Evid. 803(6) (Sup. Ct. Draft 1972). The House Judiciary Committee
added language limiting the activity to businesses, professions, occupations
and callings of every kind. See H.R. 5463, 93d Cong. 2d Sess. (1974); H.R. REP.
No. 93-650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1973). The Senate Judiciary Committee
attempted to delete the business restriction and return the rule to its original form. See S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 16-17 (1974). The Conference Committee adopted the House version but expanded the definition even
further. See H.R. REP. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1974). In view of the
broad "business" definition ultimately adopted in Rule 803(6), it is questionable whether the Rule actually differs in effect from the original unrestricted
version.
210. FED. R. EVID. 803(6). Compare the business definition in the Federal
Rule with that in 28 U.S.C. § 1732(a) (1970) (business, profession, occupation
and calling of every kind) and in 9A U.L.A. 506 § 1 (1965) (business, profession, occupation, calling or operation of institutions, whether carried on for
profit or not).
211. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1732(a) (1970) (act, transaction, occurrence or
event); 9A U.L.A. 506 § 2 (1965) (act, condition or event); UNIFORM RULE OF
EVID. 63(13) (1953) (act, condition or event); MODEL CODE OF EVID. rule 514(1)
(1942) (act, event or condition).
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admissible against a criminal defendant, 2 12 the broader Rule
803(6) exception for business records expresses no such limitation concerning the admissibility of records containing
opinions and diagnoses. Yet, while Rule 803(6) includes a special trustworthiness requirement similar to that of Rule
803(8),213 the Advisory Committee's note to Rule 803(6) provides no corresponding guidelines for the determination of
reliability. 2 14 Ideally, however, the courts will exercise a large
measure of discretion to assure that proffered evidence has
the requisite degree of reliability and that the criminal defendant's right of confrontation is not infringed.
Although the federal business records exception retains
the traditional requirement that the recorder or informant
have first-hand knowledge of the event recorded, 2 15 the wellestablished condition included in the Supreme Court's version
of the Rules that all steps in the preparation of the proffered
record be pursuant to the course of business 216 was omitted
by Congress, apparently inadvertently, in the process of
amending the language of this exception. 217 Thus, if literally
construed, the possibility exists that a record which either
contains information received from someone not acting in the
regular course of business or embraces opinions based on
such information could be admitted. Consequently, the omitted requirement should be presumed included until the ostensible oversight is corrected.
Since police reports have occasionally been admitted
under the rubric of business records, 2 18 the question arises
212. For text of Rule 803(8), see note 192, supra.
213. Rule 803(6) sanctions the admissibility of business records "unless
the source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation
indicate lack of trustworthiness."
214. The Advisory Committee suggested guidelines for the determination
of admissibility of evidence under the Rule 803(8) exception for public records. See Advisory Committee Note in note 200, supra.
215. See MCCORMICK § 310.

216. See id. § 308.
217. The Supreme Court draft of this exception read: "A.

.

. record ...

of

acts .. . made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by... a
person with knowledge, all in the course of a regularly conducted activity, as
shown by the testimony of the custodian .... " 56 F.R.D. 183, 300-301 (1972). In
an effort to clarify the requirement that the record itself be one that was
regularly kept, the House Judiciary Committee moved the word "all" to the
location in which it now appears. See H.R. 5463, 93d Cong. 2d Sess. (1974). For
text of Rule 803(6), see note 208, supra.
218. See MCCORMICK § 310.
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whether they can be given that status under the Federal
Rules. The Advisory Committee apparently assumed that
police reports are admissible as business records, 219 and this
assumption has been reiterated by at least one commentator. 20 Since the admissibility of such reports in civil cases
is seemingly within the scope of Rule 803(8),221 the public
records exception, their admissibility in civil cases under the
Rule 803(6) exception for business records would result in
little practical difference. Significantly, however, Rule 803(8)
was amended by Congress expressly to ensure that police
records would not be admissible in criminal cases. 222 Legislative history indicates not only that the amendment was
aimed specifically at preserving a criminal defendant's right
of confrontation, 223 but also that police reports were not intended to be admissible at all against a criminal defendant
under the Federal Rules. 224 In light of the legislative intent
and the serious confrontation problems that could result,
especially if such reports are based on information from outside sources, 225 they should not be admitted against an accused under Rule 803(6). These considerations would not be at
issue, however, when an accused seeks admissibility of police
reports on his own behalf.
Learned Treatises
The
803(18)226

hearsay exception expressed in Federal Rule
represents a significant departure from the cus-

219. See FED. R. EVID. 803(6), Adv. Comm. Note.
220. See Evans, Article Eight of the FederalRules of Evidence: The Hearsay Rule, 8 VAL L. REV. 261, 282 (1974).
221. For text of Rule 803(8), see note 192, supra.
222. See note 193, supra.
223. See 120 CONG. REC. H563-65 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1974).
224. See statement of Congressman William L. Hungate, Conferee and
Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Criminal
Justice, upon presentation of the Conference Report to the House for final
consideration of H.R. 5473, 120 CONG. REC. H12254 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1974)
("As the rules of evidence now stand, police and law enforcement reports are
not admissible against defendants in criminal cases"). See also, 120 CONG.
REC. H563-65 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1974) (House discussion of amendments to
section 803(8)(B)); 120 CONG. REC. H12255-56 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1974) (House
debate over whether to adopt Conference Committee's Report).
225. See text beginning at note 215, supra.
226. FED. R. EVID. 803(18): "To the extent called to the attention of an
expert witness upon cross-examination or relied upon by him in direct
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tomary rule that learned treatises and similar publications
may be used only on cross-examination of an expert witness
for impeachment purposes, provided the witness first recognizes the publication as authoritative or relies upon it in
forming his opinion. 227 The Federal Rule permits statements
contained in qualified publications to be read into evidence 228
to prove the truth of their content when used in conjunction
with expert testimony on direct or cross-examination. 229 Although the publication must be established as reliable authority, 230 it need not be acknowledged as such or relied upon
by the opposing expert. Louisiana apparently follows the
traditional rule precluding the use of such material as sub23 1
stantive evidence.
Judgments of Previous Convictions
In most jurisdictions, 232 including Louisiana, 233 final
judgments of conviction are generally inadmissible in subexamination, statements contained in published treatises, periodicals, or
pamphlets on a subject of history, medicine, or other science or art, established as a reliable authority by the testimony or admission of the witness or
by other expert testimony or by judicial notice. If admitted, the statements
may be read into evidence but may not be received as exhibits."
227. See MCCORMICK § 321. The traditional rule is not actually a "hearsay" exception, because such statements are usually used to impeach, rather
than to prove the truth of their assertions. Under the federal scheme,*substantive use can be made of publications-provided they are introduced only
during examination of an expert witness. The Federal Rule adopts the view
favored by Professors Morgan and Wigmore. E. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS
OF EVIDENCE 366 (1962); 6 WIGMORE §§ 1960-92. See also MODEL CODE OF
EVID. rule 529 (1942); UNIFORM RULE OF EVID. 63(31) (1953).
228. However, the Rule expressly prohibits receipt of the written text as
an exhibit.
229. Rule 803(18) restricts admissibility of these materials upon direct
examination to situations where the expert has relied on the publication.
During cross-examination, the opposing counsel must first call the material
to the attention of the witness.
230. The rule provides that reliability may be established by the testimony or admission of the witness, by other expert testimony, or by judicial
notice.
231. See, e.g., Pellegrin & Jennings v. Allstate Ins. Co., 273 So. 2d 534 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1973) (reference to medical article by expert witness on direct
exam was inadmissible as hearsay).
232. See MCCORMICK § 318.
233. E.g., New Orleans Ry. & Light Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar.
Co., 145 La. 364, 82 So. 372 (1919); Hutchins v. Westley, 235 So. 2d 434 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1970); Davis v. Bankston, 192 So. 2d 614 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966).
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sequent cases to prove the existence of the facts upon which
the conviction was based. Rule 803(22),234 adopting the minority view, permits evidence of final judgments of felony grade
convictions 235 resulting from either a trial or a plea of guilty 23 6 to prove any fact essential to sustain the judgment. 237
The language of the provision appears sufficiently broad to
encompass admissibility of final judgments against third persons in subsequent cases between different parties in which
some or all of the essential facts in issue coincide with those
upon which the conviction depended. Rule 803(22) expressly
provides, however, that the prosecution may not use thirdparty convictions in subsequent criminal cases except for imBut see Osborne v. People's Benevolent Industrial Life Ins. Co., 19 La. App.
667, 139 So. 733 (2d Cir. 1932) (recognizing general rule but approving use of
prior conviction as corroborative evidence that at the time of injury, plaintiff
was engaged in committing acts in violation of the law).
234. FED. R. EVID. 803(22): "Evidence of a final judgment, entered after a
trial or upon a plea of guilty (but not upon a plea of nolo contendere),
adjudging a person guilty of a crime punishable by death or imprisonment in
excess of one year, to prove any fact essential to sustain the judgment, but
not including, when offered by the Government in a criminal prosecution for
purposes other than impeachment, judgments against persons other than
the accused. The pendency of an appeal may be shown but does not affect
admissibility."
235. The Rule admits judgments as to conviction of a crime punishable
by death or imprisonment in excess of one year which, measured by federal
standards, includes only those of a felony grade. The Advisory Committee's
Note explains that convictions of minor offenses are excluded in light of the
possible lack of motivation to defend at such levels. FED. R. EVID. 803(22),
Adv. Comm. Note.
236. The Rule expressly excludes pleas of nolo contendere. Contrary to
final judgments, guilty pleas may be admissible under other traditional exceptions to the hearsay rule such as declarations against interest of a nonparty opponent or as admissions of a party opponent. See, e.g., Hutchins v.
Westley, 235 So. 2d 434 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970) (guilty plea admissible under
recognized hearsay exception for admissions). See also MCCORMICK § 318.
Under Federal Rule 801(d)(2), admissions are exempted from the hearsay
exclusionary rule, but the result as to admissibility is generally the same. See
text beginning at note 70, supra.
237. Rule 803(22) does not concern situations where former judgments
are admitted as conclusive evidence under the doctrines of res judicata or
collateral estoppel. See FED. R. EVID. 803(22), Adv. Comm. Note. Additionally,
the Rule should have less effect in subsequent criminal trial than in civil
cases, since the admissibility of evidence of prior crimes against an accused is
specifically limited to those situations where the evidence has an independent relevance. See FED. R. EVID. 404; Comment, Determining Relevancy:
Article IV of the FederalRules of Evidence, 36 LA. L. REV. 70, 78-81 (1975). See
also LA. R.S. 15:444-46 (1950); State v. Prieur, 277 So. 2d 126 (La. 1973).
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peachment purposes.25 The Rule also stipulates that the
pendency of an appeal affects merely the weight of the evidence and not its sufficiency.

Exceptions in Which Unavailabilityof DeclarantIs Required
Under certain exceptions to the hearsay rule, unavailability of the declarant is traditionally a prerequisite for admissibility. 239 In accordance with this scheme, Federal Rule
804 defines unavailability and enumerates the specific excep240
tions in which it is required.

Definition of Unavailability
Federal Rule 804(a) 24 1 provides a broad and relatively
uniform definition of unavailability. A declarant is generally
deemed "unavailable" if he is dead or physically or mentally
238. The limitation in criminal cases codifies the constitutional principle
expressed in Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47 (1899) (error to convict of
possessing stolen postage stamps with the only evidence of theft being the
record of conviction of the thieves). The Advisory Committee's Note points
out the distinction to be made when the conviction of a third person is
actually an element of the crime, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 902(d), interstate shipment
of firearms to a known convicted felon. FED. R. EVID. 803(22), Adv. Comm.
Note.
239. See MCCORMICK §§ 255, 280, 282, 322.
240. The five hearsay exceptions which require that the declarant be
unavailable are: Rule 804(b)(1), former testimony; Rule 804(b)(2), statement
under belief of impending death; Rule 804(b)(3), statement against interest;
Rule 804(b)(4), statement of personal or family history; and Rule 804(b)(5), the
residual exceptions, discussed in text beginning at note 131, supra.
241. FED. R. EVID. 804(a): "'Unavailability as a witness' includes situations in which the declarant-(1) is exempted by ruling of the court on the
ground of privilege from testifying concerning the subject matter of his
statement; or (2) persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter
of his statement despite an order of the court todo so; or (3) testifies to a lack
of memory of the subject matter of his statement; or (4) is unable to be
present or to testify at the hearing because of death or then existing physical
or mental illness or infirmity; or (5) is absent from the hearing and the
proponent of his statement has been unable to procure his attendance (or in
the case of a hearsay exception under subdivision (b)(2), (3), or (4), his attendance or testimony) by process or other reasonable means. A declarant is not
unavailable as a witness if his exemption, refusal, claim of lack of memory,
inability, or absence is due to the procurement or wrongdoing of the proponent of his statement for the purpose of preventing the witness from attending or testifying."
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incapacitated, is beyond the reach of the court's subpoena, 24
effectively claims a privilege, testifies to lack of memory, 24 or
refuses to testify despite a court order, unless the party seeking to utilize his statement purposely induces his unavailability. The definition is so broad, however, that it necessarily
encompasses the possibility of interference with an accused's
right of confrontation. 244 The Louisiana requirements for
unavailability, as those in most jurisdictions, 245 have developed in the contexts of specific exceptions and are nar246
rower than the federal standard.
242. When the proponent of a hearsay statement is unable to secure the
attendance of an absent witness by process or otherwise, in order for statements under belief of impending death, against interest, or of personal or
family history to be admissible, the proponent must also show that the
witness's testimony could not be obtained. FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(5). For text of
the Rule, see note 241, supra. Also, as noted by the Advisory Committee,
differences in the range of process might lead to a less exacting requirement
in civil cases than in criminal cases. FED. R. EVID. 804(a), Adv. Comm. Note.
See, e.g., Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968); State v. Thomas, 290 So. 2d 690
(La. 1974); State v. Sam, 283 So. 2d 81 (La. 1973).
243. According to the House Judiciary Committee, the Rule represents
no change in existing federal law; the judge remains free to disbelieve the
declarant's testimony. H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1973).
244. See discussion in note 127, supra.
245. See MCCORMICK §§ 253, 280, 282.
246. No Louisiana cases can be found in which the courts have admitted
a dying declaration or a statement of pedigree other than when the declarant
has died. See, e.g., Succession of Anderson, 176 La. 66, 145 So. 270 (1933) (to be
admissible, declaration must be made by person since deceased). In a recent
Louisiana Supreme Court case, a declaration against interest was admitted
where the declarant was residing in England at the time of trial. Campbell v.
American Home Assur. Co., 260 La. 1047, 258 So. 2d 81 (1972). In another case
dealing with a statement against interest, the appellate court seemingly
failed to adhere to the unavailability requirement; closer analysis reveals,
however, that the court may have simply confused statements against interest made by a nonparty declarant with the traditional exception for admissions of a party opponent, where unavailability is not required. LeBlanc
v. Phoenix Assur. Co., 158 So. 2d 256 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963). Under FED. R.
EVID. 801(d)(2), admissions are exempted from the hearsay exclusionary rule.
In Louisiana, admissions are treated as exceptions to the hearsay rule. See
text at note 52, supra. The result as to admissibility is substantially the
same. Louisiana courts have been liberal in their application of the unavailability requirement for former testimony in civil cases. See, e.g., State v.
Scarbrough, 167 La. 484, 119 So. 523 (1928) (permanent departure from state
and whereabouts unknown); State v. Wheat, 111 La. 860, 35 So. 955 (1903)
(serious illness); State v. New Orleans Waterworks Co., 107 La. 1, 31 So. 395
(1901) (loss of memory due to lapse of time). See also Hincks v. Converse, 38
La. Ann. 871 (1886); Truxillo v. Casso, 55 So. 2d 601 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1951)
(testimony may be used by either party if witness is dead, absent, or for other
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Statements under Belief of Impending Death
The Federal Rules not only perpetuate the controversial
well-known "dying declaration" exception 247 but broaden its
previously narrow scope. Although Rule 804(b)(2) 24 continues
the conventional limitation on admissibility of dying declarations in criminal cases to homicide prosecutions, 249 it removes
the usual restrictions that the statement be that of the
homicide victim and that it concern the death at issue in the
proceeding. More significantly, however, it extends the exception to all civil cases. Finally, the unavailability requirement
is now satisfied not only by death, but by any of the conditions under Rule 804(a), 250 provided the declarant believed
that his death was imminent when he made the statement. In
Louisiana, dying declarations, though inadmissible in civil
cases, 25 1 are admissible under a special statute in abortion as
well as in homicide prosecutions; 252 otherwise, the Louisiana
courts generally adhere to the traditional rules pertaining to
253
this exception.
cause cannot be produced). Cf. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 295. In criminal cases,
Louisiana courts have narrowed the scope of absence from the jurisdiction in
light of the confrontation clause. See, e.g., State v. Thomas, 290 So. 2d 690 (La.
1974); State v. Sam, 283 So. 2d 81 (La. 1973).
247. See MCCORMICK § 281.
248. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2): "In a prosecution for homicide or in a civil
action or proceeding, a statement made by a declarant while believing that
his death was imminent, concerning the cause or circumstances of what he
believed to be his impending death."
249. The Supreme Court draft proposed to extend the dying declaration
exception to all criminal cases. Fed. R. Evid. 803(b)(3) (Sup. Ct. Draft 1972).
The House Judiciary Committee added the limitation to homicide cases only,
with the comment that "the Committee did not consider dying declarations
as among the most reliable forms of hearsay." H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. 15 (1974).
It is unclear whether negligent homicide prosecutions are within the
scope of the Rule. Traditionally, the exception has applied to intentional
homicides only. See 5 WIGMORE § 1432.
250. For text of FED. R. EVID. 804(a), see note 241, supra.
251. E.g., Marler v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 52 La. Ann. 727, 27 So. 176 (1900)
(the court expressed its view that dying declarations given with a view
toward civil proceedings might be influenced by the declarant's concern for
the future welfare of his family, whereas such a motive would not usually be
present in a homicide situation); Willis v. Kern, 21 La. Ann. 749 (1869).
252. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 482(B): "An indictment for manslaughter
may also contain a count for abortion and the jury may convict of either
offense . .. . Dying declarations shall be admissible in proof of either count."
253. For a discussion of the dying declaration exception in Louisiana, see
Comment, Dying Declarationsin Louisiana Law, 22 LA. L. REV. 651 (1962).
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The historical premise that underpins the trustworthiness of dying declarations is that consciousness of imminent
death usually suspends the motivation to lie. 254 Unfortunately, even when limited to homicide cases, this rationale is
not only based on a dubious and unprovable assumption-that
dying persons rarely lie-but it ignores the presence of dangers such as inaccurate perception, memory, and reportorial
ability which could severely impair the. reliability of these
statements. 25 5 However, the rationale degenerates even
further when applied to civil actions in which the subject
matter of the declaration may involve pecuniary gain for the
declarant's loved ones. Under these circumstances, the reliability of dying declarations is additionally undermined by the
motive to lie for self-exoneration or the future welfare of the
declarant's family. 256 For these reasons, it is submitted that
the dying declaration exception would have best remained
confined to its customary narrow application in homicide
cases, with admissibility conditioned upon the existence of a
compelling need for the statement.
Statements against Interest
Rule 804(b)(3) 257 retains the familiar hearsay exception
authorizing admission of statements against the pecuniary or
proprietary interest of a nonparty declarant. 25 The Federal
Rule resolves questions concerning the meaning of
"pecuniary or proprietary interest" by expressly including
254. See MCCORMICK § 282.
255. See, e.g., discussion in note 249, supra, cases cited in note 251, supra;
P. ROTHSTEIN, UNDERSTANDING THE NEW FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE,

459 n.45 (Supp. 1975). The notion that dying declarations are reliable conflicts
with the theory of the dead man rule, under which evidence of statements
made by a decedent are excluded as unreliable and untestable. See MCCORMICK § 65.
256. The same argument would apply to negligent homicide prosecutions.
See discussion in second paragraph of note 249, supra.
257. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3): "A statement which was at the time of its
making so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest,
or so far tended to subject him to civil or criminal liability, or to render
invalid a claim by him against another, that a reasonable man in his position
would not have made the statement unless he believed it to be true. A
statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to
exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances
clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement."
258. See MCCORMICK § 276.
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statements that subject the declarant to civil liability or that
render invalid his claim against another. Further, in accord
with the modern trend, 259 the Rule expands the exception to
encompass statements that tend to expose a declarant to criminal liability. 260 Louisiana follows the more limited traditional
view under which only statements against pecuniary or pro261
prietary interest are admissible.
One customary prerequisite to admissibility which Rule
804(b)(3) does not specifically mention is that the declarant
must have personal knowledge of the subject of his declaration. 26 2 The Advisory Committee's Note indicates, however,
that the redactors did not intend to discard the first-hand
26 3
knowledge requirement.
Extrajudicial statements against penal interest, made by
third parties, that tend to exculpate or inculpate a criminal
defendant involve special problems. Rule 804(b)(3) limits the
admissibility of statements against penal interest to those
instances in which "corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement. ' 264 The effect of
the Rule is that an absent third party's uncorroborated
statement incriminating himself and exculpating a party
litigant is admissible on behalf of the party litigant in a civil
case, but is inadmissible on behalf of a criminal defendant
even though his life might be at stake. 26 5 On the other hand,
259. See generally id. § 278.
260. The Supreme Court draft of the Federal Rules included within the
scope of this exception statements tending to make the declarant an object of
hatred, ridicule, or social disapproval, 56 F.R.D. 183, 321 (1972), but this
provision was deleted by the House Judiciary Committee as affording insufficient guarantees of reliability. See H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
16 (1973). For text of Supreme Court draft of Rule 804(b)(3), see note 266,
infra.
261. See, e.g., Campbell v. American Home Assur. Co., 260 La. 1047, 258
So. 2d 81 (1972); State v. Nash, 169 La. 947, 960-61, 126 So. 434, 438 (1930);
State v. Jones, 127 La. 694, 53 So. 959 (1911); State v. Young, 107 La. 618, 31
So. 993 (1901). But see State v. Morrow, 260 La. 72, 77-78, 255 So. 2d 78, 80
(1971) (dissenting opinion taking the view that declarations against penal
interest should also be admissible).
262. See MCCORMICK § 276.
263. See FED. R. EVID. 803, Adv. Comm. Note.
264. The restriction does not apply in civil cases.
265. Under the rationale of Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973),
such statements might be allowed on behalf of the defendant even when the
declarant is available. In Chambers, however, there was additional corroborating evidence. Also, FED. R. EVID. 607 abandons the voucher rule
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the Rule expresses no limitation concerning hearsay statements that jointly incriminate both the unavailable declarant
and the accused despite the fact that their admissibility
266
would be highly suspect under confrontation principles.

Conclusion
Rules 803 and 804 expand the admissibility of hearsay
evidence significantly beyond the scope of the rules adhered
to in most jurisdictions, including Louisiana. The redactors
tempered the extensiveness of the Rules, however, by couching the exceptions in terms of exemption from the general
prohibition of the hearsay rule, rather than in positive terms
of admissibility. Thus the Rules incorporate means whereby
which precludes re-occurrence under the Federal Rules of the situation which
resulted in a denial of due process under Chambers.
266. See, e.g., Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968); Douglas v.
Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965). Legislative history of Rule 804(b)(3) indicates
there was much controversy concerning the treatment of third-party hearsay
statements inculpating and exculpating an accused and a lack of any definite
consensus regarding the formulation of the Rule that was ultimately
adopted. As originally drafted, this Rule read: "A statement which was at the
time of its making so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interests, or so far tended to subject him to civil or criminal liability, or
to render invalid a claim by him against another, or to make him an object of
hatred, ridicule, or social disapproval, that a reasonable man in his position
would not have made the statement unless he believed it to be true. This
example does not include a statement or confession offered against the accused in a criminal case, made by a codefendant or other person implicating
both himself and the accused." 46 F.R.D. 161, 378 (1969); 51 F.R.D. 315, 438-39
(1971). In the Supreme Court draft, the Advisory Committee deleted the
concluding sentence and replaced it with the following: "A statement tending
to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the
accused is not admissible unless corroborated." 56 F.R.D. 321 (1972). The
House Judiciary Committee expanded the corroboration requirement to its
present wording (see note 257, supra) and replaced the sentence excluding
inculpatory statements. See H.R. 5463, 93d Cong. 2d Sess. (1974); H.R. REP.
No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 16-17 (1973). The Senate Judiciary Committee,
however, deleted the latter sentence, explaining that it was doing so in order
to avoid the codification of constitutional principles. S. REP. No. 1277, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 21-22 (1974). The Committee's argument is specious, however,
in light of the fact that other such principles have been codified in the
Federal Rules (see, e.g., note 238, supra), and since the exclusion would in fact
have gone further than constitutionally mandated, the provision was not
merely one which incorporated a constitutional principle, but rather, one
which reflected a determination to implement the underlying policy of the
Constitution and thus ought to have been codified.
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the court can exclude evidence fitting into a hearsay exception when it lacks sufficient reliability under the particular
circumstances of an individual case. Because most of the exceptions apply so broadly to both civil and criminal cases, the
courts will have to exercise even greater discretion when the
criminal defendant's right of confrontation is involved.
Shelly Crittendon Zwick

